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Abstract.
In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining
problems with coalition structure, of several values which have
been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with
coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the
solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues (2004) and
Vidal-Puga (2005a). Several axiomatic characterizations and
two noncooperative mechanisms are proposed.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many economic and political situations, agents do not act individually
but are partitioned into unions, groups, or coalitions. Examples include
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through projects BEC2002-04102-C02-02 and SEJ2005-07637-C02-01, and from Xunta
de Galicia through Project PGIDT03PXI20701PN is gratefully acknowledged.political parties in a Parliament, wage bargaining between ﬁrms and labor
unions, tariﬀ bargaining between countries, bargaining between the member
states of a federated country, etc.
Assuming that cooperation is carried out, one may wonder how the ben-
eﬁt is shared between the coalitions and between the members inside each
coalition. Game Theory has addressed this issue. Several solutions have
been proposed for several kind of games. Most of these solutions have the
Harsanyi paradox (Harsanyi, 1977), which says that an individual can be
worse oﬀ bargaining as a member of a coalition than bargaining alone. This
paradox makes some solutions inadequate for some situations. Nevertheless,
in other situations this is not so relevant. For instance, when coalitions are
ﬁxed and agents can not leave it. A good example could be a group of
countries (considered as coalitions of local governments) bargaining about
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
In this paper, we focus on bargaining problems where agents are parti-
tioned into coalitions. Recently, several papers have studied this issue. Chae
and Moulin (2004) take an axiomatic approach whereas Vidal-Puga (2005b)
takes a non-cooperative approach. In both cases, they ﬁnd rules without
the Harsanyi paradox.
Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2005a) describe two values in
bargaining problems with coalition structure. Chae and Heidhues follow an
axiomatic approach whereas Vidal-Puga (2005a) follows a non-cooperative
approach. Both values generalize the Nash solution and have the Harsanyi
paradox. Our paper is closely related to these papers.
We also study games with transferable utility (TU games), and games
with non-transferable utility (NTU games). It is well-known that bargaining
problems and TU games can be expressed as NTU games. We mention some
solutions for TU games and NTU games with coalition structure, which are
relevant for our paper.
In TU games with coalition structure, Owen (1977) proposes a value,
which is an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). Casas-Méndez,
García-Jurado, van den Nouweland, and Vázquez-Brage (2003) extend the
τ − value (Tijs, 1981) to TU games with coalition structure.
In NTU games with coalition structure there are several values. Winter
(1991) introduces the game coalition structure value which coincides with
the Owen value in TU games with coalition structure and with the Harsanyi
value (Harsanyi, 1963) in NTU games. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005)
introduce two values: the consistent coalitional value and the random order
2coalitional value. Both values coincide with the Owen value in TU games
with coalition structure and with the consistent value (Maschler and Owen,
1989, 1992) in NTU games. Following the classical λ−transfer procedure
we can extend values from TU games to NTU games. In particular, in
diﬀerential games Krasa, Tememi and Yannelis (2003) extend the Owen
value. Let λTC and τ −λTC be the NTU values obtained when we extend
the Owen value and the coalitional τ − value (Casas-Méndez et al., 2003),
respectively.
We prove that, in bargaining problems with coalition structure, the val-
ues proposed in Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2005a) coincide.
We call this value δ. Moreover, the ﬁve NTU coalitional values mentioned
a b o v ea l s oc o i n c i d ew i t hδ in bargaining problems with coalition structure.
This is the reason why we call δ a focal point solution.
Moreover, we present three new axiomatic characterizations of δ. The
ﬁrst one uses the properties of Independence of Aﬃne Transformations
(IAT), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), and Unanimity Coali-
tional Game. This result is inspired in the characterization of the game
coalition structure value (Winter, 1991).
T h es e c o n do n eu s e sIAT,IIA,Pareto Eﬃciency, Symmetry inside Coali-
tions, and Coalitional Symmetry. This result is inspired in the characteri-
zation of the Owen value (Owen, 1977).
T h et h i r do n eu s e sIAT, IIA, Pareto Eﬃciency, Symmetry inside Coali-
tions, and Symmetry between Exchangeable Coalitions. This result is also
inspired in the characterization of the Owen value (Owen, 1977).
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) propose a bargaining mechanism in NTU
games. The set of limit subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀsi sc o n t a i n e d
in the consistent value. This mechanism has several rounds and in each
round a proposer is randomly chosen among the active players. We modify
this mechanism in two ways following the same idea: Each possible round
is played in two levels, one of them among players inside a coalition and the
other among coalitions. We prove that in bargaining problems there exists
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ that approaches δ.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the no-
tation and some previous results. In Section 3, we present the axiomatic
characterizations of δ. In Section 4, we prove that the ﬁve NTU coalitional
values coincide with δ in bargaining problems. In Section 5, we study the
non-cooperative approach. Finally, we present the proofs.
32 Preliminaries
Let A be a ﬁnite set. We denote by |A| the number of elements of A. Let us
take x,y ∈ RA.W es a yy ≤ x when yi ≤ xi for each i ∈ A and y<xwhen
yi <x i for each i ∈ A.W ed e n o t eb yxy the vector (xiyi)i∈A and by x + y









x ∈ RA : xi > 0 for every i ∈ A
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For every S ⊆ RA and γ,β ∈ RA,w ed e ﬁne γS + β = {γx+ β : x ∈ S}.
Given θ ∈ R and x ∈ RA,w ed e ﬁne θx as the vector (θxi)i∈A.
We consider N = {1,...,n} the set of players.
A coalition structure C over N is a partition of the player set, i.e.,
C = {C1,...,C p} ( 2N where ∪Cq∈CCq = N and Cq∩Cr = ∅ whenever q 6= r.
Each Cq ∈ C is called a coalition.W ed e n o t eb yc ∈ RN the vector whose
ith coordinate is given by ci = |Cq| if i ∈ Cq.
A transferable utility (TU) game is a pair (N,v) where v is a charac-
teristic function that assigns to each subset T ⊆ N an u m b e rv(T) ∈ R,
with v(φ)=0 , which represents the total utility players in T can get by
themselves when cooperate. A TU game with coalition structure is a triple
(N,v,C) where (N,v) is a TU game and C is a coalition structure over N.
The Owen value (Owen, 1977) is a function Ow which assigns to each
TU game with coalition structure (N,v,C) a vector Ow(N,v,C) ∈ RN.T h e
Owen value generalizes the Shapley value (Sh) (Shapley, 1953), i.e. when
C = {N} or C = {{1},...,{n}},O w(N,v,C)=Sh(N,v).
A bargaining problem over N is a pair (S,d) where d ∈ S (R N,t h e r e
exists x ∈ S such that x>d ,a n d
A1. S is closed, convex, comprehensive (if x ∈ S and y ≤ x then y ∈
S), and bounded above (i.e. for all x ∈ S the set {y ∈ S : y ≥ x} is
compact).
A2. The boundary of S, ∂S,i ssmooth (on each point of the boundary there
exists a unique outward vector) and nonlevel (the outward vector on
each point of the boundary has all its coordinates positive).
4We denote by Λ the bargaining problem (∆,d) with
∆ =
(





and di =0for every i ∈ N.W e c a l l (∆,d) the unanimity bargaining
problem.
The Nash solution of a bargaining problem (Nash, 1950) is the unique
point N (S,d) ∈ ∂S satisfying
Y
i∈N




(xi − di). (1)
A bargaining problem with coalition structure is a triple (S,d,C) where
(S,d) is a bargaining problem and C is a coalition structure. By B(N) we
represent the class of all bargaining problems with coalition structure where
N is the set of agents.
A solution of a bargaining problem with coalition structure is a map
which assigns to every (S,d,C) ∈ B(N) an element of S.
In this context, Chae and Heidhues (2004) characterize the solution de-
ﬁned by the unique point δ (S,d,C) ∈ ∂S satisfying
Y
i∈N
(δi (S,d,C) − di)
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This solution is the weighted Nash solution (Kalai, 1977), Nw,w i t hwi = 1
pci
for any i ∈ N,d e ﬁned on B(N).
A non-transferable utility (NTU) game is a pair (N,V) where V is a
correspondence which assigns to each coalition T ⊆ N a subset V (T) (R T.
This set represents all the possible payoﬀst h a tm e m b e r so fT can obtain
for themselves when play cooperatively. For each T ( N, we assume that
V (T) satisﬁes A1 and that V (N) satisﬁes A1 and A2. A payoﬀ conﬁguration ©
xTª
T⊆N is a family of vectors such that xT ∈ RT for every T ⊆ N.
NTU games generalize both TU games and bargaining problems. Any
TU game (N,v) can be expressed as an NTU game (N,V) with
V (T)=
(





for all T ⊆ N.









i xi ≤ v(T)
)
(3)
for some v :2 N → R.N o t i c et h a te a c hTU game is a hyperplane game (just
take λT
i =1for each T ⊆ N and i ∈ T).




x ∈ RT : x ≤ dT
ª
for all T ( N (4)
and V (N)=S.
An NTU game with coalition structure is a triple (N,V,C) where (N,V)
is an NTU game and C is a coalition structure over N.B y NTU(N) we
denote the class of all NTU games with coalition structure where N is the
set of agents.
A value Γ is a correspondence which assigns to each NTU game with
coalition structure (N,V,C) a subset Γ(N,V,C) ⊆ V (N).
Notice that a solution on B(N) c a nb ec o n s i d e r e da sav a l u ew h i c h
assigns to each (S,d,C) a singleton.
We say a value Γ generalizes the Owen value if Γ(N,v,C)={Ow(N,v,C)}
for each TU game with coalition structure (N,v,C).
We say that a value Γ generalizes the Nash solution if Γ(S,d,C)=
{N (S,d)} for every bargaining problem with coalition structure (S,d,C)
when C = {N} or C = {{1},...,{n}}.
We say that a value Γ generalizes the solution δ if Γ(S,d,C)={δ (S,d,C)}
for every bargaining problem with coalition structure (S,d,C).
3 Characterizations of the solution δ
In this section we present three characterizations of the solution δ deﬁned
in (2). We introduce some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1 Let (S,d,C) ∈ B(N).
We formulate some reasonable properties of a solution deﬁned on B(N).
Let ϕ be an arbitrary solution deﬁned on B(N) and let (S,d,C) ∈ B(N).
6• Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Let us take (S0,d,C) ∈
B(N) such that S0 ( S and ϕ(S,d,C) ∈ S0,t h e nϕ(S0,d,C)=
ϕ(S,d,C).
• Invariance with respect to aﬃne transformations (IAT). Given γ ∈
RN
++,a n dβ ∈ RN, it holds that ϕ
¡¯ S, ¯ d,C
¢
= γϕ(S,d,C)+β,w h e r e
¯ S = γS + β and ¯ d = γd+ β.
• Pareto eﬃciency (PE). There is no x ∈ S \{ ϕ(S,d,C)} such that
xi ≥ ϕi (S,d,C) for every i ∈ N.
• Unanimity coalitional game (UCG). Given the unanimity bargaining




for every i ∈ N.
• Symmetry inside coalitions (SG). Given Cq ∈ C,l e ti,j ∈ Cq be two
symmetric agents, then ϕi (S,d,C)=ϕj (S,d,C).
• Symmetry between exchangeable coalitions (SEG). Given any pair of
exchangeable coalitions Cr,C s,t h e nϕi (S,d,C)=ϕj (S,d,C) for any
i ∈ Cr and j ∈ Cs.
• Coalitional symmetry (CS). Given the unanimity bargaining problem







for every Cr,C s ∈ C.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives, invariance with respect to aﬃne
transformations, and Pareto eﬃciency are well-known properties.
Aumann (1985) deﬁned the property of unaminity to characterize the
Shapley-NTU value. This property says that the unanimity game4 of a
coalition has a unique value given by the equal split of the available amount.
Hart (1985) also used this property to characterize the Harsanyi value in
4Given T ⊆ N, the unanimity game of the coalition T i st h eT Ug a m ed e ﬁned as
uT (R)=1if T ⊆ R ⊆ N and uT (R)=0 ,o t h e r w i s e .
7the context of NTU games. De Clippel, Peters, and Zank (2004) also use
this property in the characterization of the egalitarian Kalai-Samet solution
(Kalai and Samet, 1985). Winter (1991) used the property unanimity games
in his characterization of the NTU value for NTU games with coalition
structure. The unanimity coalitional game property has the same ﬂavour in
the context of bargaining problems with coalition structure.
The property of symmetry inside coalitions establishes that two symmet-
ric agents of the same coalition obtain the same value. This property diﬀers
from the property of symmetry proposed by Chae and Heidhues (2004).
According to the property of symmetry between exchangeable coalitions,
all members of two exchangeable coalitions receive the same amount. The
property of coalitional symmetry has the same ﬂavour that SG but applied
to coalitions.
Next we provide our characterizations of the solution δ using these prop-
erties.
Theorem 2 1.- The solution δ is the unique solution deﬁned on B(N)
which satisﬁes IIA, IAT,a n dUCG.
2.- The solution δ is the unique solution deﬁned on B(N) which satisﬁes
PE, IIA, IAT, SG,a n dCS.
3.- The solution δ is the unique solution deﬁned on B(N) which satisﬁes
PE, IIA, IAT, SG,a n dSEG.
Proof See the Appendix.
We analyze the independence of the properties in Theorem 2.
1. The properties IIA, IAT,a n dUCG are independent.
(a) The Nash solution satisﬁes IIA and IAT, but not UCG.
(b) The weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Gutiérrez-López, 1993)
with weights given by wi = 1
pci for each i ∈ N,i sd e ﬁned as




where for each i ∈ N,
ui =m a x{t ∈ R :( d1,...,d i−1,t,d i+1,...,d n) ∈ S}, and
ˆ t =m a x
½











8satisﬁes IAT and UCG, but not IIA.







ˆ t =m a x
½











satisﬁes IIA and UCG, but not IAT.
2. The properties PE, IIA, IAT, SG,a n dCS are independent.
(a) The solution ν1 which assigns to each bargaining problem with
coalition structure (S,d,C) the vector d satisﬁes IIA, IAT, SG,a n d
CS, but not PE.
(b) The weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solution deﬁn e di n( 5 )s a t i s ﬁes
PE, IAT, SG,a n dCS, but not IIA.
(c) The solution deﬁn e di n( 6 )s a t i s ﬁes PE, IIA, SG,a n dCS, but
not IAT.
(d) Let Nw be the weighted Nash solution where w is a vector of
weights such that wi 6= wj for any i,j ∈ Cq and
P
i∈Cq wi = 1
p,f o r
each coalition Cq ∈ C. This solution satisﬁes PE, IIA, IAT,a n dCS,
but not SG.
(e) The Nash solution satisﬁes PE, IIA, IAT,a n dSG, but not CS.
3. The properties PE, IIA, IAT, SG,a n dSEG are independent.
(a) The solution ν1 deﬁned above satisﬁes IIA, IAT, SG,a n dSEG,
but not PE.
(b) The solution ν2 deﬁned as
ν2 (S,d,C)=
½
δ (S,d,C) if |C| > 1
η(S,d,C) if |C| =1
satisﬁes PE, IAT, SG,a n dSEG, but not IIA.
(c) The solution ν3 deﬁned as
ν3
i (S,d,C)=di + ˆ t, for every i ∈ N
where ˆ t is given by
ˆ t =m a x{t ∈ R++ :( d1 + t,...,d n + t) ∈ S}
9satisﬁes PE, IIA, SG,a n dSEG, but not IAT.
(d) Let w be a vector of weights such that there exist i,j ∈ N with
wi 6= wj.T h es o l u t i o nν4 deﬁned as
ν4 (S,d,C)=
½
δ (S,d,C) if |C| > 1
Nw (S,d,C) if |C| =1
satisﬁes PE, IAT, IIA,a n dSEG, but not SG.
(e) The Nash solution satisﬁes PE, IIA, IAT,a n dSG, but not SEG.
Finally, we would like to mention that there is no relationship between
the property SEG and the property of representation of an homogenous
coalition (RHG) proposed in Chae and Heidhues (2004) as we illustrate
next. For instance, the following solution ν5 which assigns to any bargaining
problem with coalitional structure (S,d,C) ∈ B(N) the point
ν5 (S,d,C)=
½
δ (S,d,C) if |N| > 3
ν4 (S,d,C) if |N| ≤ 2
satisﬁes SEG but not RHG. Furthermore, the solution ν0 deﬁned in (6)
satisﬁes RHG but not SEG.
4T h e s o l u t i o n δ is a focal point
In this section we show that the following values, the Game with Coali-
tion Structure (GCS) value (Winter, 1991), the Consistent Coalitional (CC)
value (Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2005), the Random-Order Coalitional
(ROC) value (Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2005), the λ-Transfer Coalitional
(λTC) value, and the τ-λ Transfer Coalitional (τ − λTC) value, generalize
the solution δ. Even though these values are deﬁned in the context of NTU
games with coalitional structure, we recall the formal deﬁnitions in the con-
text of bargaining problems with coalition structure. Let (S,d,C) ∈ B(N).
The GCS value, ΦGCS, was presented by Winter (1991) as a general-
ization of the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure and the
Harsanyi value (Harsanyi, 1963) for NTU games. We say that x ∈ RN is an
element of the GCS value for (S,d,C) if there exists a vector λ ∈ RN
++ such







deﬁned inductively as follows:
y∅ =0 ,
10and for every ∅ 6= T ⊆ N,g i v e nyT0
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cT t ≤ dT
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t ∈ R : zT + 1
λT
1
cT t ∈ S
o
if T = N.
Then, y{i} = di for each i ∈ N.F o re v e r yT ( N with |T| ≥ 2, zT
i = di for
every i ∈ T and yT
i =0for every i ∈ T.F o rT = N,w eh a v e































and we get that x belongs to ΦGCS (S,d,C).W ew i l ld e n o t et h es e to fp o i n t s
which satisﬁes (7) as ΦGCS (S,d,C).
In case that the bargaining problem with coalition structure is given by










ΦGCS (Hλ,d,C) is the unique vector which satisﬁes (7).
The CC value, ΦCC, and the ROC value, ΦROC,w e r ep r o p o s e di n
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005) as a generalization of the Owen value for
TU games with coalition structure and the consistent value (Maschler and
Owen, 1989, 1992) for NTU games. Following Vidal-Puga (2005a) we ﬁrst




++ : T ⊆ N
ª
be a family of vectors and let x ∈ ∂S be





i = di, for every i ∈ N,
11given xT0












































































































By doing some algebra, we obtain that xT = dT for every T ( N.I fxN = x
we say that x is a CC value for (S,d,C) and it holds that



















We will denote the set of points which satisﬁes (9) as ΦCC (S,d,C).
In case that the bargaining problem with coalition structure is given by
(Hλ,d,C) where λ ∈ RN
++ and Hλ is deﬁned as in (8), ΦCC (Hλ,d,C) is the
unique vector which satisﬁes (9).
Next we present the deﬁnition of the ROC value. Let
©
λT ∈ RT
++ : T ⊆ N
ª
be a family of vectors and let x ∈ ∂S be such that λN supports S at x.L e t
π an order over N.F o re a c hi ∈ N,w ed e n o t eb yπ(i) the agent i’s position
in the order deﬁned by π and we deﬁne the set of predecessors of i under π
as
Pπ
i = {j ∈ N : π(j) <π (i)}.
Let ΠC be the set of all orders over N compatible with C, that means
π ∈ ΠC ⇐⇒ [for every Cq ∈ C, i,j ∈ Cq and π (i) <π(k) <π(j) ⇒ k ∈ Cq].
12Let us consider π ∈ ΠC.F o re a c hT ⊆ N and i ∈ T, the marginal contribu-
tion of player i in the order π is
eT




















whenever T ( N or T = N and π(i) <n ,a n d
eT




















when T = N and π(i)=n.









eT(π), for every T ⊆ N.
In case that xN = x,w es a yt h a tx is a ROC value for (S,d,C).W ed e n o t e
by ΦROC (S,d,C) the ROC value of (S,d,C).
Let us take i ∈ N.N o t i c et h a teN




























































This expression coincides with (9). Then, we prove that ΦCC(S,d,C)=
ΦROC(S,d,C).
13Given a value for TU games, Shapley (1969) proves, via a ﬁxed-point
argument, that one can always ﬁnd a vector λ of weights, one for each
player, such that when each player’s utility is multiplied by his weight, the
resulting game will have the property that the value for the associated TU
game (as presented in (10) below) is feasible in the NTU game.
Since the Shapley reasoning may be applied to any value, we apply the
λ-transfer procedure to the Owen value and the coalitional τ value (Casas-
Méndez et al, 2003).
The λTC value generalizes the Owen value for TU games with coalition
structure and the Shapley NTU value (Shapley, 1969) for NTU games.
Given a bargaining problem with coalition structure (S,d,C),w es a y
that x ∈ RN is a λ-Transfer Coalitional (λTC) value if x ∈ ∂S, there exists
λ ∈ RN

















λjxj : x ∈ S
)
if T = N
. (10)
We denote by ΦλTC (S,d,C) the set of λTC values for (S,d,C).
The τ −λTC value generalizes the coalitional τ value for TU games with
coalition structure (Casas-Méndez et al, 2003) and the τ value for NTU
games (Borm et al, 1992).
Given (S,d,C) ∈ B(N),w es a yt h a tx ∈ RN is a τ-λTC value if x ∈ ∂S,
there exists λ ∈ RN
++ such that λ supports S at x,a n d
λx = τ(N,vλ,C)
where vλ i st h eT Ug a m ed e ﬁned in (10).I f(S,d,C) is a bargaining problem
with coalition structure, we denote by ΦτλTC(S,d,C) the set of τ − λTC
values for (S,d,C).
Theorem 3 The values ΦGCS, ΦCC, ΦROC, ΦλTC,a n dΦτλTC assign to
each bargaining problem with coalition structure, (S,d,C), a unique vector
which coincides with δ (S,d,C).
Proof See the Appendix.
145 A non-cooperative perspective
In the context of NTU games, Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) design a simple
non-cooperative mechanism of negotiation between n players. Applied to
bargaining problems, this mechanism is as follows: In each round, a player
is randomly chosen to propose a payoﬀ. If all the other players agree, the
mechanism ﬁnishes with this payoﬀ. If at least a player disagrees, the mech-
anism is repeated with probability ρ ∈ [0,1). With probability 1 − ρ,t h e
proposer leaves the mechanism and thus each player gets his disagreement
payoﬀ.
In Theorem 3 in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), it is shown that the above
mechanism (when applied to bargaining problems) yields the Nash bargain-
ing solution as ρ approaches 1.
Vidal-Puga (2005a) adapts this mechanism when players are divided in
coalitions. Hart and Mas-Colell’s mechanism is played in two levels, ﬁrst
between players inside each coalition and second between coalitions. In the
ﬁrst level, players inside the same coalition decide (following Hart and Mas-
Colell’s mechanism) which proposal to use in the second level.
Formally:
Mechanism I First, a proposer i ∈ C1 is randomly chosen out of coalition
C1 ∈ C, being each player equally likely to be chosen. Player i proposes
af e a s i b l ep a y o ﬀ, i.e. ap o i n ti nS.T h em e m b e r so fC1\{i} are then
asked in some prespeciﬁed order. If one of the members of C1\{i}
rejects the proposal, then with probability ρ the mechanism is repeated
under the same conditions, and with probability 1−ρ the mechanism
ﬁnishes in disagreement. If all the members of C1\{i} accept the
proposal, then the same procedure is repeated with coalition C2,a n d
so on. If there is no rejection, one of the proposals is chosen at random,
being each proposal equally likely to be chosen. Say the proposal of
coalition Cq is chosen. Then, the members of N\Cq are asked in
some prespeciﬁed order. If one of the members of N\Cq rejects the
proposal, then with probability ρ the mechanism is repeated under the
same conditions, and with probability 1−ρ the mechanism ﬁnishes in
disagreement. If the mechanism ﬁnishes in disagreement, the ﬁnal
payoﬀ is d.
This structure in two levels appears in many situations where negoti-
ations are carried out by agents who are the delegates of larger coalitions.
15Delegates begin to negotiate among them not before agreeing their proposals
with their respective coalitions.
H o w e v e r ,i tm a yb ep o s s i b l ea ni n v e r s es t r u c t u r e : ac o a l i t i o ni sﬁrst
chosen to make a proposal, and only then they choose a proposer to make
the oﬀer.
Formally:
Mechanism II First, a coalition Cq out of C is randomly chosen, being each
coalition equally likely to be chosen. Then, a proposer i is randomly
chosen out of Cq, being each player equally likely to be chosen. Player
i proposes a feasible payoﬀ, i.e. ap o i n ti nS.T h em e m b e r so fN\{i}
are then asked in some prespeciﬁed order. If one of the members of
N\{i} rejects the proposal, then with probability ρ the mechanism is
repeated under the same conditions, and with probability 1 − ρ the
mechanism ﬁnishes in disagreement. In the latter case, the ﬁnal payoﬀ
is d.
This procedure is the adaptation to bargaining problems of the mecha-
nism that appears in Section 4.4. in Vidal-Puga (2002).
Clearly, each player i ∈ N is chosen as proposer with probability µi = 1
pci.
This mechanism also generalizes Hart and Mas-Colell’s bargaining mech-
anism (applied to bargaining problems) when the coalition structure is triv-
ial. However, it is not equivalent to the mechanism in Vidal-Puga (2005a).
In particular, it does not implement the Owen value when applied to a TU
game with coalition structure. For more details, see Section 4.4 in Vidal-
Puga (2002).
As in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) and Vidal-Puga (2005a), we work
with stationary strategies. This means that the proposal of an agent is
independent of the previous history. When we say equilibrium, we mean
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. Notice that an equilibrium is also
optimal against non-stationary strategies.
Theorem 4 If (S,d,C) ∈ B(N), in the two above mechanisms there ex-
ists an equilibrium for each ρ ∈ [0,1).M o r e o v e r , a s ρ approaches 1,a n y
equilibrium payoﬀ converges to δ (S,d,C).
Proof See the Appendix.
16Appendix
Proofs of the results in Section 3.
We ﬁrst state some logical relations among the properties.
Lemma 5 Any solution ϕ deﬁned on B(N) which satisﬁes PE, SG,a n d
CS also satisﬁes UCG.
Proof Let ϕ be a solution deﬁned on B(N) which satisﬁes PE, SG,a n d
CS. Let us consider (Λ,C) ∈ B(N). For every Cr ∈ C,w eh a v et h a ta n y
two agents i,j ∈ Cr are symmetric. By SG, ϕi (Λ,C)=ϕj (Λ,C) for every
i,j ∈ Cr and Cr ∈ C. Moreover, since the solution ϕ satisﬁes CS,f o re v e r y








with i ∈ Cr and j ∈ Cs.
Finally, taking into account that the solution ϕ satisﬁes PE, we get, for










Lemma 6 Any solution ϕ deﬁned on B(N) which satisﬁes PE, IAT, SG,
and SEG also satisﬁes UCG.
Proof Let us consider the bargaining problem with coalition structure
(Hλ,0,C) where λ = 1
p
1
c and Hλ is deﬁned by (8).I f|C| =1 , the bargaining
problem (Hλ,0) is symmetric. Otherwise, any pair of coalitions Cr,C s ∈ C
are exchangeable. Since the solution ϕ satisﬁes PE, SG,a n dSEG,i th o l d s
ϕi (Hλ,0,C)=ϕj (Hλ,0,C)=1for every i ∈ Cr,j∈ Cs and Cr,C s ∈ C.
Moreover, applying the aﬃne transformation deﬁned by λ ∈ RN
++ and β =0
to (Hλ,0,C), we obtain the bargaining problem with coalition structure




for every i ∈ N.
17Proof of Theorem 2 First we will see that the solution δ satisﬁes these
properties.
The solution δ satisﬁes IIA, IAT,a n dPE (Chae and Heidhues, 2004).
Since δ is a weighted Nash solution, it assigns the vector of weights to the
unanimity bargaining problem (Kalai, 1977). Thus, given the structure of
the weights, δ satisﬁes UCG. Furthermore, the total amount that a coalition
receives in (∆,d,C) is the same and we prove that δ also satisﬁes CS.
Next, we see that it also satisﬁes SG. Let us assume that this does not
happen. Since δ satisﬁes IAT, we take a bargaining problem with a coalition
structure (S,0,C) ∈ B(N).L e tCq ∈ C and i,j ∈ Cq such that i and j are
symmetric. Let us assume that δi (S,0,C) 6= δj (S,0,C).W ed e ﬁne the point
¯ x ∈ RN as
¯ xi = 1
2 (δi (S,0,C)+δj (S,0,C)) = ¯ xj and
¯ xk = δk (S,0,C) for every k ∈ N \{ i,j}.
(11)
This point ¯ x belongs to S because i and j are symmetric and S is a convex
set. Furthermore,
¯ xi¯ xj − δi (S,0,C)δj (S,0,C)=
1
4
(δi (S,0,C) − δj (S,0,C))
2 > 0. (12)












This is a contradiction with respect to the deﬁnition of δ. Then, the solution
δ satisﬁes SG.
Let us check that it also satisﬁes SEG.L e t(S,0,C) ∈ B(N).I f|C| > 1,
let us take Cr,C s two exchangeable coalitions. Since δ satisﬁes SG we have
δi (S,0,C)=δj (S,0,C) for every i,j ∈ Cr and
δi (S,0,C)=δj (S,0,C) for every i,j ∈ Cs.
Let us deﬁne the vector z ∈ RN as
zi = δi (S,0,C) if i/ ∈ Cr ∪ Cs
zi = δj (S,0,C) if i ∈ Cr with j ∈ Cs
zi = δj (S,0,C) if i ∈ Cs with j ∈ Cr.










































Thus, z and δ (S,0,C) are solutions of the maximization problem (2).S i n c e
this solution is unique, we have z = δ (S,0,C).I np a r t i c u l a r ,δi (S,0,C)=
δj (S,0,C) for every i ∈ Cr and j ∈ Cs.
Next we prove the unicity of the solution in each case.
1.- Let us consider a solution ϕ deﬁn e do nt h ec l a s sB(N) which satisﬁes
IIA, IAT,a n dUCG.L e t(S,d,C) ∈ B(N). Because δ satisﬁes IAT,w e
assume d =0∈ RN and δ (S,d,C)=( 1 ,...,1) = e.
There exists a hyperplane which separates S and the set
(









Let us assume that λ ∈ RN
++ deﬁnes such hyperplane. Since S is a convex set
and e is the solution of the maximization problem (2),
P
i∈N
λixi ≤ 1 for every
x ∈ S. Thus, we consider the bargaining problem with coalition structure
given by (Hλ,0,C) where Hλ is deﬁned as in (8).T h e s e t Hλ is obtained
from ∆ by the aﬃne transformation deﬁned as γ = 1
λ and β =0 .S i n c eδ









By the deﬁnition of the solution δ and because S ⊆ Hλ,
















δ (Hλ,0,C)=δ (S,0,C)=e ∈ S. (14)
From (13) and (14),
ϕ(Hλ,0,C)=e ∈ S.
Since S ⊆ Hλ, ϕ(Hλ,0,C) ∈ S,a n dϕ satisﬁes IIA,w eh a v eϕ(S,0,C)=
ϕ(Hλ,0,C). Then, ϕ(S,0,C)=e = δ (S,0,C).
192.- By Lemma 5,a n ys o l u t i o nϕ which satisﬁes PE, IIA, IAT, SG,
and CS also satisﬁes IIA, IAT,a n dUCG. In these conditions, as we have
previously proved, the solution ϕ coincides with δ.
3.- Let us take any solution ϕ which satisﬁes all these properties. By
Lemma 6,a n ys o l u t i o nϕ which satisﬁes PE, IIA, IAT, SG,a n dSEG also
satisﬁes IIA, IAT,a n dUCG. Using Item 1 of this Theorem, we get that
ϕ coincides with δ.
Proofs of the results in Section 4.
Proof of Theorem 3 Let (S,d,C) ∈ B(N).
Claim 1. {δ (S,d,C)} = ΦGCS (S,d,C).
From the characterization of each point belonging to ΦGCS (S,d,C) pro-
posed in (7), it holds that ΦGCS satisﬁes IAT.S i n c eδ also satisﬁes IAT,
we assume d =0and δ (S,0,C)=( 1 ,...,1) = e.
Let us assume that the supporting hyperplane of S at e is deﬁned by
λ ∈ RN
















By (7), δ (S,0,C)=e ∈ ΦGCS (S,0,C).
Let us take x ∈ ΦGCS (S,0,C).L e tλ ∈ RN
++ be the vector which deﬁnes
the supporting hyperplane of S at x. Let us consider (Hλ,0,C) ∈ B(N)
with Hλ deﬁned as in (8). Then, δ (Hλ,0,C) ∈ ΦGCS (Hλ,0,C).M o r e o v e r ,
x ∈ ΦGCS (Hλ,0,C) because x ∈ ΦGCS (S,0,C) ∩ Hλ.S i n c eΦGCS (Hλ,0,C)
is a singleton, δ(Hλ,0,C)=x.M o r e o v e r ,b e c a u s eS ⊆ Hλ, δ(Hλ,0,C) ∈ S,
and δ satisﬁes IIA,w eh a v e
x = δ(Hλ,0,C)=δ(S,0,C)=e,
and the claim is proved.
Claim 2. {δ (S,d,C)} = ΦCC (S,d,C).
It follows from similar reasoning as we did in Claim 1.N o t i c et h a tΦCC
satisﬁes IAT, and assuming that d =0and δ(S,0,C)=e, we obtain that
δ(S,0,C) satisﬁes (9).
Claim 3. {δ (S,d,C)} = ΦROC (S,d,C).
We have previously seen that ΦROC (S,d,C)=ΦCC (S,d,C).
20Claim 4. {δ (S,d,C)} = ΦλTC (S,d,C).
For every λ ∈ RN
++ such that the game vλ deﬁned as in (10) is well-










for every i ∈ N.





j∈N λj (xj − dj)
pci
for every i ∈ N,
and thus ΦλTC (S,d,C)=ΦCC (S,d,C)={δ (S,d,C)}.
Claim 5. {δ (S,d,C)} = ΦτλTC(S,d,C).
It follows from a similar reasoning that Claim 4, because, for every λ ∈
RN










for every i ∈ N.
The result is proved.
Proofs of the results in Section 5.
The proof for Mechanism I comes from Theorem 12 in Vidal-Puga (2005a),
Claim 2 and an analogous reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 12 below.
Hence, we concentrate on Mechanism II.
In order to prove Theorem 4 for Mechanism II, we need further notation.





µiai (ρ) ∈ RN
be the ﬁnal payoﬀ when all the proposals are due to be accepted. When there
is no ambiguity, we write a and ai instead of a(ρ) and ai (ρ), respectively.
Proposition 7 Given ρ ∈ [0,1), the proposals in any equilibrium of a bar-
gaining problem with coalition structure (S,d,C) are characterized by
P1 ai (ρ) ∈ ∂Sfor each i ∈ N and
P2 ai
j (ρ)=ρaj (ρ)+( 1− ρ)dj for each j 6= i.
21Moreover, the proposals are always accepted and ai (ρ) ≥ d for each
i ∈ N.
This Proposition is similar to Proposition 1 in Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996). However, in Hart and Mas-Colell the vector a is the average of
the ai’s. In this case, a is a weighted average with weights given by the µi’s.
Proof Assume we are in equilibrium. Let b ∈ RN be the expected ﬁnal
payoﬀ.E a c hp l a y e ri ∈ N can guarantee himself a payoﬀ of at least di by
proposing always d and accepting only proposals which give him no less than
di.T h u s ,b ≥ d.
We must prove that conditions P1 and P2 hold. We proceed by two
Claims:
Claim (A): Assume the proposer is i ∈ Cq. Then, all players in N\{i}
accept ai if ai
j >ρ b j +( 1− ρ)dj for each j 6= i.I fai
j <ρ b j +( 1− ρ)dj
for some j 6= i, then the proposal is rejected.
Notice that, in the case of rejection, the expected payoﬀ of a player
j 6= iis ρbj +( 1− ρ)dj.
We assume without loss of generality that i =1and (2,...,n)is the order
in which the players in N\{i} are asked.
If the game reaches player n, i.e. there has been no previous rejection,
his optimal strategy involves accepting the proposal if ai
n is higher than
ρbn +( 1− ρ)dn and rejecting it if it is lower than ρbn +( 1− ρ)dn.P l a y e r
n−1 anticipates reaction of player n.H e n c e ,i fan >ρ b n+(1− ρ)dn, an−1 >
ρbn−1 +( 1− ρ)dn−1, and the game reaches player n − 1, he accepts the
proposal. If an <ρ b n +( 1− ρ)dn,t h e np l a y e rn − 1 is indiﬀerent between
accepting or rejecting the proposal, since he knows player n is bound to
reject the proposal should the game reach him. In any case, the proposal is
rejected. By going backwards, we prove the result for all players in N\{i}.
C l a i m( B ) :A s s u m et h ep r o p o s e ri sp l a y e ri. Then, his proposal is ac-
cepted.
Assume the proposal of player i is rejected. This means the ﬁnal payoﬀ
for player i is ρbi +( 1− ρ)di.
We deﬁne a new proposal ai for player i as follows. Since b ∈ S and d
belongs to the interior of S, by convexity ρb+(1− ρ)d belongs to the interior
of S. Thus, it is possible to ﬁnd ε>0 such that ρb +( 1− ρ)d +( ε,...,ε)
belongs to S.L e t ai = ρb +( 1− ρ)d +( ε,...,ε).B y Claim (A),t h i so ﬀer
is accepted and the ﬁnal payoﬀ for player i is ρbi +( 1− ρ)di + ε.T h i s
22contradiction proves Claim (B).
Since all the proposals are accepted, and each player i has probability
µi to be chosen as proposer, we can assure that b = a.
We show now that P1 and P2 hold.
Suppose P1 does not hold, i.e. there exists a player i such that ai is not
Pareto optimal. Thus, ai belongs to the interior of S; so, there exists ε>0
such that ai +( ε,...,ε) ∈ S.
Notice that, since the proposal ai of player i is accepted (Claim (B)), by
Claim (A) we know that ai
j ≥ ρaj +( 1− ρ)dj for each j 6= i.S o ,i fp l a y e r
i changes his proposal to ai +( ε,...,ε), it is bound to be accepted and his
expected ﬁnal payoﬀ improves by µiε>0. This contradiction proves P1.
Suppose P2 does not hold. Let j0 6= i be a player such that ai
j0 =
ρaj0 +( 1− ρ)dj0 + α with α 6=0 .B yClaim (A)a n dClaim (B), α>0.
Let x ∈ RN be deﬁned by xj0 = α and xj =0for all j 6= j0.B y
comprehensiveness and nonlevelness, we have ai − x belongs to the interior
of S. Thus, there exists ε>0 such that
b ai := ai − x +( ε,...,ε)
belongs to S. Suppose player i changes his proposal to b ai.L e tb aj = aj for
all j 6= i. The new average b a =
P
i∈N µib ai satisﬁes
b ai
i = ai
i − xi + ε = ai








j − xi + ε = ai
j + ε>a i
j ≥ ρaj +( 1− ρ)dj for all j 6= i,j0.
Thus, by Claim (A), the new proposal of player i is due to be accepted.
Also, player i improves his expected payoﬀ. This contradiction proves P2.
Conversely, we show that proposals (ai)i∈N satisfying P1 and P2 can be
supported as an equilibrium.
First, we prove that ai ≥ d for all i ∈ N. By convexity, x = ρa +
(1 − ρ)d belongs to S.F i xi ∈ N,b yP 2 ,w eh a v eai
j = xj for all j 6= i.W e











µi (ρaj +( 1− ρ)dj)=ρaj +( 1− ρ)dj
and thus (1 − ρ)aj ≥ (1 − ρ)dj, i.e. aj ≥ dj.
23Fix a player i ∈ N. If he rejects the proposal from a proposer j 6= i,h i s
expected ﬁnal payoﬀ is ρaj +(1−ρ)dj. Thus, his expected ﬁnal payoﬀ is the
same as that the other player is oﬀering. Since the rest of the players accept
the proposal, he does not improve his expected ﬁnal payoﬀ by rejecting it.
If the proposer is player i himself, the strategies of the other players do not
allow him to decrease his proposal to any of them (since it would be rejected
by Claim (A)). Moreover, increasing one or more of his oﬀers to the other
players keeping the rest unaltered implies his own payment decreases (by
P1 and nonlevelness). Finally, by oﬀering an unacceptable proposal, he may
be dropped out and his expected ﬁnal payment becomes di, which does not
improve his ﬁnal payoﬀ because ai
i ≥ di.T h u s , t h e p r o p o s a l s d o f o r m a n
equilibrium.
Proposition 8 Let S =
©
x ∈ RN :
P
i∈N λixi ≤ ξ
ª
for some λ ∈ RN
++ and
ξ ∈ R. Assume a set of proposals
¡
ai¢
i∈N satisﬁes P1 and P2. Then a =
δ (S,d,C), i.e.











for each i ∈ N.



















































λj (ρaj +( 1− ρ)dj)













Since ai ∈ ∂S and
P
j∈N µj =1 ,w eh a v e
P
j∈N λjaj = ξ.H e n c e ,
λiai = ρλiai +( 1− ρ)λidi + µi
















and dividing by (1 − ρ),








which completes the proof because ξ =
P
j∈N λjaj.
Corollary 9 Assume S =
©
x ∈ RN :
P
i∈N λixi ≤ ξ
ª
for some λ ∈ RN
++,
ξ ∈ R. Then, for each ρ ∈ [0,1), there exists a unique equilibrium payoﬀ,
which equals δ (S,d,C).
Proof Immediate from Proposition 7 and Proposition 8.
Proposition 10 Let (S,d,C) ∈ B(N). Then, for each ρ ∈ [0,1),t h e r e
exists an equilibrium.
Proof By Proposition 7, we only need to prove that there exist proposals
satisfying P1 and P2.
25Let K = {x ∈ S : x ≥ d}. This set is nonempty (d ∈ K), closed (because
S is closed), and bounded. Thus, K is a compact set. Furthermore, K is
convex (because S is convex).
We deﬁne n functions αi : K → K as follows. Given i ∈ N, αi
j(x): =
ρxj +( 1− ρ)dj for each j 6= i and αi
i (x) is deﬁned in such a way that
αi (x) ∈ ∂S.
These functions are well-deﬁned because y := ρx +( 1− ρ)d belongs to
K (by convexity) and αi(x)equals y in all coordinates but i’s, which we
increase until reaching the boundary of S.
Also, because of the smoothness of S the functions αi are continuous.
By the convexity of the domain,
P
i∈N µiαi(x) ∈ K for each x ∈ K.B y
a standard ﬁx point theorem, there exists a vector a ∈ K satisfying a = P
i∈N µiαi(a).




satisﬁes P1 and P2.
Proposition 11 Let (S,d,C) ∈ B(N) and let
¡
ai¢
i∈N be the proposals in
equilibrium. Then, there exists M ∈ R such that
¯ ¯ ¯ai
j − aj
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ M(1 − ρ) for
all i,j ∈ N.
Proof Fix i ∈ N.G i v e nj ∈ N\{i},b yP 2 :
¯ ¯ai
j − aj
¯ ¯ = |ρaj +( 1− ρ)dj − aj| =( 1− ρ)|aj − dj|.
We deﬁne
Mi
1 =m a x{|aj − dj| : j ∈ N\{i},ρ∈ [0,1)}.
Notice that aj depends on ρ. This maximum is well-deﬁned because




¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ Mi



























































µjai − (1 − ρ)
X
j6=i
















µjai − (1 − ρ)
X
j6=i
µjdi − (1 − ρ)µiai




























µi max{|ai − di| : ρ ∈ [0,1)}.
Using arguments similar to those used with Mi
1 we can argue that Mi
2 is
well-deﬁned, for each i ∈ N.










Proposition 12 Let (S,d,C) ∈ B(N),a n dl e ta(ρ) be an equilibrium pay-
oﬀ for each ρ ∈ [0,1). Then, a(ρ) → δ (S,d,C) when ρ → 1.
Proof Note that a(ρ) → δ (S,d,C) means that for all ε>0 there exists
ρ0 ∈ [0,1) such that if ρ>ρ 0 then, |a(ρ) − δ (S,d,C)| <ε .
27Assume the result is not true. This means that there exists ˆ ε>0 such







k=0 ( [0,1) be a sequence with ρk
0 → 1.F o r e a c h k,i ti s






¯ ¯ ≥ ˆ ε.S i n c e ρk
0 → 1
and ρk >ρ k










≥ d for each k and S is closed, there exists a∗ ≥ d such














Since ρk → 1, by Proposition 11, ai ¡
ρk¢
→ a∗ for each i ∈ N.S i n c e
ai(ρ) ∈ ∂S for each ρ ∈ [0,1), i ∈ N and ∂S is closed, we conclude that
a∗ ∈ ∂S.
Let λ be the unit length vector normal to ∂S at a∗.W e a s s o c i a t e t o
each ρk a bargaining problem with coalitional structure (Sk,d,C) as follows:





. If there are more than one hyperplane, we take the





























for all i,i0 ∈ N.
Since ai ¡
ρk¢
→ a∗ for all i ∈ N, by the smoothness of ∂S, λk → λ.
Therefore,




















satisfy P1 and P2 for





















































¯ ¯ ≥ ˆ ε
for each k =0 ,1,....T h i sp r o v e st h er e s u l t .
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